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again, made reference to the scope provi-
sion of Rule 74 1 (a)(3), noting that in reen-
actment the provision had been moved 
from subsection (a)(3) to subsection (g) and 
now reads "obligations of the State's At-
torney under this Rule." Md. Rule 4-263(g) 
(emphasis added). "This change merely 
presents more clearly the intent of the 
predecessor, Md. Rule 741(a) and does 
not represent an enlargement of the obli-
gations of a State's Attorney in furnishing 
disclosure." 303 Md. at 651, 496 A.2d 
at 668. 
Finally, the state argued that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in decid-
ing to admit Officer Jenkin's testimony 
and in permitting prosecutor's reference to 
it in his opening remarks. Alternatively, 
the state claimed that if there was error, it 
was not prejudicial. The court, once again, 
rejected this contention, drawing an anal-
ogy between this case and Colter v. State, 
297 Md. 423,466 A.2d 1286 (1983). Colter 
involved the portion of the discovery rule 
dealing with the identity of alibi witnesses 
and rebuttal-to-alibi witnesses. The court 
held that the practice of the judge exclud-
ing testimony from these nondisclosed 
witnesses was an abuse of discretion. In 
the instant case, however, the trial judge 
ruled there was no discovery violation, the 
question was never reached as to what 
sanction, if any, should be applied. The 
court went on to explain that there was a 
discovery violation in this case and whether 
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or not it was prejudicial, turns on two 
things. The first is whether Bailey would 
have moved to suppress upon obtaining 
the statements; the second is whether that 
motion to suppress would have been suc-
cessful. 
Based on the above reasoning, the court 
remanded the case without affirmance or 
reversal, mandating that the trial court 
undertake a process potentially involving 
three steps. First, the trial judge will real-
ize that there was a discovery violation. He 
shall consider the defendant's objection as 
of the time it was made and then determine 
the appropriate remedy. If exclusion is the 
proper remedy, then a new trial will be 
granted. If exclusion is not necessary, then 
the judge proceeds to step two. 
Next, a suppression hearing should be 
held if the defendant moves to suppress on 
other grounds. At that hearing, a deter-
mination of whether to exclude or not must 
be made. Again, if exclusion is the appro-
priate remedy a new trial must be granted. 
Step three involves the determination of 
prejudice. If exclusion was not the appro-
priate remedy in the suppression hearing, 
the state must then prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that there was no prejudice or 
the judge shall grant a new trial. 
The court's holding in Bailey serves two 
purposes. First, it furthers the rationale 
behind Md. Rule 4-263; that of requiring 
the state to disclose statements, therefore 
apprising the defendant of the evidence 
against him, and forcing the defense to file 
motions to suppress prior to trial. Second, 
the ruling clearly lays out a three step anal-
ysis for the trial court to follow in evaluat-
ing possible discovery violations under the 
rule. 
- Lori S. Simpson 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.lmrex Company, 
Inc.: THE SUPREME COURT GIVES 
ITS APPROVAL TO THE USE OF 
THE CIVIL RICO PROVISIONS 
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, 
Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985), the Supreme 
Court examined the utilization of the pri-
vare civil action provisions of the Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act ("RICO" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1970). The Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals of the Second 
Circuit and may serve to greatly expand 
the use of the private civil action provi-
sions ofRICO. 
In 1979, Sedima, a Belgian corporation, 
entered into a joint venture agreement 
with Imrex to provide electronic com-
ponents to another Belgian corporation. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the 
buyer was to order the parts through Se-
dima, and then Imrex was to obtain the 
parts in this country and ship them to 
Europe. The net proceeds were to be split 
between Sedima and Imrex. However, Se-
dima became convinced that Imrex was 
presenting inflated bills, thereby cheating 
Sedima out of its fair share of the proceeds 
by collecting for nonexistent expenses. 
In 1982, Sedima filed suit in the Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York against Imrex, setting forth 
several common law claims. In addition, 
Sedima filed claims under the civil action 
provisions of RICO, pursuant to § 1964(c). 
Two counts alleged violations of§ 1962(c), 
based on the predicate acts of mail and 
wire fraud. The third count alleged a con-
spiracy to violate § 1962(c). 
The district court dismissed the RICO 
counts for failure to state a claim. The 
court held the requirement of § 1964(c) 
that the jury be "by reason of a violation of 
section 1962", means that it must be dif-
ferent in kind from the direct injury result-
ing from the predicate acts of racketeering 
activity. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Com-
pany, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983). The court further held the com-
plaint must allege a "RICO-type injury", 
which was some type of distinct racketeer-
ing or competitive injury. Id. at 965. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision 
in determining that Sedima's complaint 
was defective in two regards. Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Y Inc., 741 
F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). The first defect, 
according to the court, was that the com-
plaint failed to allege an injury "by reason 
ofa violation of section 1962." The court 
determined that the intent of Congress 
was to compensate victims of organized 
crime and not to provide additional rem-
edies for injuries which were already com-
pensable. The court also found the com-
plaint to be defective because it failed to 
allege that the defendants had already been 
criminally convicted of the predicate acts 
of mail and wire fraud, or of a RICO viola-
tion. In reaching its conclusion, the court 
indicated its distress at the "extraordinary, 
if not outrageous" uses to which the pri-
vate civil action provisions of RICO have 
been put. !d. at 487. 
The Supreme Court, in a five to four de-
cision, reversed the decision of the lower 
court. Justice White, writing the majority 
decision, found two basic reasons for the 
Court's holding. First, he determined that 
there is no requirement that a private civil 
action under § 1964(c) may only be imple-
mented against a defendant who has previ-
ously been convicted of a predicate act or 
of a RICO violation. Second, the Court 
found no requirement that in order for a 
plaintiff to proceed under § 1964(c), it 
must first establish a "racketeering injury", 
not merely an injury resulting from the 
predicate acts themselves. 
The Supreme Court found numerous 
reasons for rejecting the requirement that 
a private civil action could only be main-
tained against a defendant who has already 
been convicted of a predicate act, or of a 
RICO violation. First, the Court examined 
the statutory language of the RICO Act 
and determined it gave no such indication. 
The Court noted the term "conviction" 
does not appear in any relevant part of the 
statute. It was also noted the definition of 
"racketeering activity" does not include 
acts for which the defendant has been con-
victed, but rather acts for which he could 
be convicted. Second, the Court examined 
the legislative history of the Act and found 
that if Congress had intended to impose 
such a requirement, there would have been 
some mention of it there. Finally, the 
Court determined such a requirement 
would be inconsistent with Congress' pol-
icy concerns by severely handicapping po-
tential plaintiffs and by only allowing ac-
tions to be brought against those persons 
who had already been brought to justice. 
In reaching its conclusion that a plaintiff 
must first establish a "racketeering injury" 
and not merely an injury resulting from 
the predicate acts themselves, the Court 
relied primarily upon an interpretation of 
the statutory language. It was determined 
the language of the statute belies the re-
quirement that there must be a "racketeer-
ing injury" which is separate from the 
harm caused by the predicate acts. Justice 
White set forth the following elements in-
volved in a violation of section 1962( c), 
which must be alleged by the plaintiff in 
order to state a claim: (1) conduct, (2) of an 
enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of 
racketeering activity. The Court held any 
damages occurring due to a violation of 
section 1962(c) will flow from the commis-
sion of the predicate acts. 
In one dissenting opinion Justice Powell 
expressed his "disagreement with the 
Court's conclusion that the statute must be 
applied to authorize the types of private 
civil actions now being brought frequently 
against respected businesses to redress 
ordinary fraud and breach of contract 
cases." !d. at 3288 (1. Powell dissenting). 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice 
Marshall disagreed with the majority's 
reading of the statute. He stated that, "I 
believe that the statutory language and his-
tory discloses a narrower interpretation of 
the statute that fully effectuates Congress' 
purposes, and that does not make com-
pensable under civil RICO a host of claims 
that Congress never intended to bring 
within RICO's purview." !d. at 3293 (1. 
Marshall dissenting). 
RICO was developed as an aggressive 
step on the part of Congress to supplement 
the existing remedies and to develop new 
methods for fighting crime, particularly 
organized crime. For a number of years 
after its enactment, RICO was used pri-
marily to deal with organized crime and its 
private civil action provisions were gen-
erally ignored. However, beginning in the 
1980's these provisions began to develop 
in a rapid manner. Although the Supreme 
Court recognized the private civil action 
provisions of RICO have evolved into 
something quite different from the orig-
inal concept of Congress, the Court has ac-
cepted this evolution. According to Justice 
White, the fact that RICO has been ap-
plied in situations which were not antici-
pated by Congress demonstrates the breadth 
of the Act, not necessarily the Act's am-
biguity. The logical conclusion that can be 
drawn from this decision is that, barring a 
change of heart by the Supreme Court, the 
private civil action provisions of RICO 
will become more frequently used and 
provide an additional cause of action for 
those persons who may otherwise have 
only been able to bring common law claims. 
-Marc Minkove 
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